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HISTORIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:            
SIGNIFICANCE AND PROBLEMS FOR A CRITICAL VIEW 
Martti Koskenniemi* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Let me thank Jeff Dunoff for that introduction and, of course, for the 
invitation to visit Temple and Philadelphia for the first time. I must say, I am 
embarrassed to confront the situation of two days of discussion over issues that I 
have been pondering over many years with friends, many of whom I see in the 
audience. This is quite an exceptional situation, and I look forward to a humbling, 
delightful two days. 
I will be speaking today, as I have in the recent past, on the history of 
international law. I must confess that I never thought of myself as a historian until 
recently when, as I skim the newspaper in the mornings, I tend to think that 
nothing really interesting seems to have happened since the French Revolution. 
But perhaps that is the nature of historical work; one becomes completely 
immersed in it. So, I hope you will bear with me as the present reflections, too, will 
grow out of my present work on the history of international legal thought from the 
late Middle Ages to the Napoleonic Wars. In the course of that work, I have had to 
confront a number of methodological questions. What it is to do international legal 
history, and especially legal history in a critical vein? In this talk, I shall 
foreground some of those questions without any pretense at comprehensiveness. 
The comments seek rather to identify a set of pertinent issues that anyone, 
including myself, dealing with international law’s past, and the relationship of that 
past to the present, will have to think about. 
Interest in the history of international law has grown tremendously in the 
recent years. It is now ten years since the inauguration of the Journal of the History 
of International Law. In that decade, something like twenty-four doctoral theses 
and other studies on the history of international law have been published by the 
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History in Frankfurt, under the leadership 
of its formidable director Michael Stolleis, and another series is starting with Brill 
publishers in the Netherlands. Just a few weeks ago in Berlin, a large event 
celebrated the launch of the more than 1,000-page Oxford Handbook of the History 
of International Law.1 And to pinpoint a particularly significant development—the 
sudden interest in the history of human rights. Until not so long ago, human rights 
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were considered paradoxically as both universal and eternal as well as very recent; 
somehow out of history it seemed, at most, subjected to occasional celebrations of 
the rise of present humanitarianisms. Thanks to the work of scholars such as 
Annabel Brett, Diethelm Klippel, Samuel Moyn, and others, however, rights have 
been situated in context, and a lively debate has begun on the continuities and 
ruptures governing their historical role.2 
I think reasons for this turn to history are obvious. The dramatic increase in 
the 1980s and 1990s of international legal institutions and recourse to legal 
vocabularies in international policy created expectations about the spread of the 
“rule of law” and the pacific settlement of international disputes that failed to be 
met by the beginning of the new millennium. The narrative about the progress of 
peace and justice that accompanied the rise of new institutions—the World Trade 
Organization, human rights treaty bodies, the International Criminal Court—was 
undermined by heightened religious and social conflict, often accompanied by 
domestic and international violence in a way that threw a shadow on the new 
institutions. We see today, I think, a backlash grown out of disappointment that 
reflects on the plausibility of the inherited narratives. The taken for granted role of 
lawyers and intellectuals in the participation of endless institutional reforms and 
blueprints has come to seem quite problematic, no longer that attractive as a career 
option for a new generation. Instead what seems needed is a better understanding 
of how we have come to where we are now—a fuller and a more realistic account 
of the history of international law and institutions. 
My presentation today will proceed in three parts. I will first say something 
about international legal history in its traditional modes as narratives building not 
only on familiar, but also fragile and contested assumptions about what 
international law as “law” is and how international legal “development” ought to 
be understood. All historians have a debt to their predecessors. We need to deal 
with those narratives respectfully, even when we find their operative principles 
methodologically or ideologically suspect—as I think we do with respect to past 
ways of thinking about our disciplinary inheritance. The second part will examine 
the Eurocentrism of international legal history, a topic that I have previously 
written about3 and that remains a source of all kinds of methodological difficulty. 
In the third part, I will examine the benefits and limits of the “contextual turn” in 
the history of legal and political thought, and in international law specifically. We 
need more contextual readings of past international law. But at the same time, as 
critical lawyers have always known, law cannot just be a reflection of the social or 
historical context. It contains, and must contain, a utopian, context-breaking 
aspect. How to integrate that into the studies of international legal history is 
perhaps the greatest methodological challenge today. To put this in other terms, as 
historical awareness increases, it should be accompanied by a more complex 
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understanding of the relationship between the historian, ourselves, and the past. 
II.  LINEAR TRADITIONS 
Those of us who grew into international law in the 1970s and 1980s learned to 
think of it through a very specific historical narrative, one of humanitarian 
progress. One aspect of this was secularization. We learned to think of events such 
as the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, or the destruction of Native American 
communities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as a result of a lethal 
combination of religious fervor and imperial ambition. Paradoxically, we learned 
that narrative from such Protestant activists as Hugo Grotius, whose naturalist, 
scientifically-orientated way to look at the universe also included a providential 
view of the Dutch East India Company’s militaristic activities. The view of 
providence operating through international law was then the subject of a series of 
philosophical positions developed by another Protestant, Immanuel Kant, whose 
famous 1784 essay on the Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose 
laid the basis for a historical understanding of the European Enlightenment as the 
coming into consciousness of humankind’s universal telos: freedom realized in 
public institutions under a constitution.4 We learned to appreciate the Peace of 
Westphalia as a first step to be complemented by the gradual liberation of 
individuals, too, from their communities’ chains. If the League of Nations or the 
U.N. Charter were still perhaps necessary parts of the statist nature of the 
international order—quite flawed as such—then we learned from Kant to view this 
state of affairs as a temporary moment before “perpetual peace” would be realized 
in some sort of a global order where communities’ and individuals’ legitimate 
claims would be balanced under the international “rule of law.” Successive 
invocations of a “Grotian moment” reminded us of the teleology of our discipline. 
But this was stuff from textbooks and speeches at the United Nations whose 
point was only to remind us of international law’s place in received narratives of 
modernist progress. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was not much professional 
international legal historiography. What there was represented two contrasting 
styles and sensibilities. There were “idealist” historians like the Alsatian, Franco-
German public lawyer Robert Redslob, whose 1923 book Histoire des grands 
principes du droit des gens (“History of the Great Principles of International Law”) 
was a narrative of a European past from the European antiquity: Greece, Rome, 
then the Middle Ages, through Renaissance and the Reformation, through the 
Enlightenment, and the nineteenth century Concert system to the Great War.5 
 
4. IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH A COSMOPOLITAN PURPOSE 
(1784), reprinted in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 41 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed. 1991). I’ve explored these themes in Martti Koskenniemi, On the 
Idea and Practice for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in TERROR, PEACE AND 
UNIVERSALISM: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT 122 (Bindu Puri & Heiko 
Sievers eds., 2007). 
5. ROBERT REBSLOB, HISTOIRE DES GRANDS PRINCIPES DU DROIT DES GENS DEPUIS 
L’ANTIQUITÉ JUSQU’À LA VEILLE DE LA GRANDE GUERRE (1923). 
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Gazing across two millennia of Western legal thought, he saw the operation of four 
“great principles,” which he identified as pacta sunt servanda (the binding force of 
treaties); the freedom of the state; equality of states; and international solidarity.6 
Hundreds of pages to assure the reader that treaties were binding, states were free, 
and their relations were governed by equality and solidarity. One wonders which 
world Redslob was describing! But his narrative was deeply embedded in a 
familiar understanding of what was important in European history. Everything 
culminated for him in the French Revolution and the future course of history 
would consist of the universalization of its principles. 
Redslob was neither the first nor the last of legal historians examining the past 
through the lenses of “great principles” or universal themes such as, for example, 
pacifism and empire, or sovereignty and international community. More recently, 
Emmanuel Jouannet has read the development of international law from the early 
Enlightenment to the present as a struggle between the principles of individual 
freedom and communal welfare—or liberalism and social democracy, if translated 
into an opposition of political projects.7 More traditional histories have focused on 
individual jurists or European thinkers of relevance for the humanitarian pursuits 
with which international law associated itself. The Swiss jurist Ernst Reibstein, for 
example, went through nearly the whole canon of the profession from the Spanish 
scholastics to such German political or legal thinkers as Johannes Althusius, 
Samuel Pufendorf, or Christian Wolff, as parts of a natural law tradition slowly 
constructing the edifice of a rational science of sovereignty, peace, and 
humanitarianism with which we have learned to associate international law.8 These 
works are still worth reading today—though we must now be suspicious of their 
underlying, and sometimes express, suggestion that history is the passing of large 
ideas or conversations over perpetual themes over centuries, a great chain of being. 
The works imagine the past obsessed with what we are obsessed with, albeit in a 
less mature, more primitive way, sometimes forgetting to read past jurists by 
reference to their own religious or political contexts or projects, as actors in worlds 
of thinking and acting often quite different from ours. Alongside this 
“contextualist” objection—to which I will return—there are jurisprudential 
problems with such histories. The view of law as “ideas” or “principles” developed 
in great scholarly treatises is a venerable, but also a much-critiqued, view of the 
law. Surely law is also, and perhaps above all, a social practice involving the 
operation of powerful public institutions. One need not be a legal realist to have 
doubts about the usefulness of thinking of law in terms of the ideas expounded in 
philosophically-minded jurists’ or political theorists’ writings. But, if at least 
something about the realist critique is correct and law is also about the institutional 
use of power, then the history of law must look elsewhere than to great principles 
 
6. Id. at 21–41. 
7. See generally EMMANUELLE JOUANNET, THE LIBERAL-WELFARIST LAW OF NATIONS: A 
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Christopher Sutcliffe trans., 2012). 
8. See, e.g., ERNST REIBSTEIN, JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS ALS FORTSETZER DER SCHULE VON 
SALAMANCA: UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR IDEENGESCHICHTE DES RECHTSSTAATES UND ZUR 
ALTPROTESTANTISCHEN NATURRECHTSLEHRE (1955); ERNST REIBSTEIN, VÖLKERRECHT: EINE 
GESCHICHTE SEINER IDEEN IN LEHRE UND PRAXIS (1958). 
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or eternal philosophical themes. 
Another way of composing histories of international law is exemplified by the 
German jurists Carl Schmitt and Wilhelm Grewe, both writing while the bombs 
were falling over Berlin during the end-phase of the Second World War. Schmitt’s 
legal realism and his late view of law as part of “concrete order thinking” are today 
well-known and have inspired his search for legal orders determined by a powerful 
centre radiating its influence across the world.9 Similar ideas inspired Grewe’s The 
Epochs of International Law,10 published in English in 2000, the most widely used 
textbook of international legal history today. It also presents a “realist” version of 
international law’s past as the succession of great empires: the Spanish Empire, the 
French Empire, the British Empire, and then what Grewe chose to call the “Anglo-
American condominium” of the twentieth century.11 Like Schmitt, Grewe thought 
of law as a (superstructural) offshoot of projects and activities expanding from the 
imperial center to its peripheries.12 The history of international law would then 
become a history of imperial power, the succession of large imperial “epochs” 
following one another: Spanish, French, British, and Anglo-American. And at the 
heart of international law would be States, war and diplomacy, strategy, and 
military power above all. Violence, or the threat of it, only makes the law tick—as 
manifested in the centrality of the balance of power for such stories. And yet, such 
an ultra-realist view of law is just as vulnerable to objections as its obverse. There 
never is a single spot that determines the law—just as imperial history can never be 
just what the emperor commands. On the contrary, empires are always divided 
against themselves, the imperial capital—a frugal source of factions quarrelling 
over policy with an imperial mainstream targeted by anti-imperial critics. Both 
sides use law and, as you in the United States know so well, sometimes the 
periphery actually wins. The realist view that law is a mere servant of power 
contains an important truth—often neglected, especially by international lawyers—
but it has an overly simple view of what “power” is and how it works, including 
how legal ideas and concepts themselves operate as “power” by indicating the 
actors, processes, and, to a degree, the very objectives of imperial policy. The idea 
of imperial power as a single causal determinant of law is no less reductionist than 
the view of law as a predominant force of history. 
What unites the “idealist” and “realist” views, however, is the (Kantian?) 
view of there being a single “universal” history in which the past unfolds slowly 
before the eyes of the historian, following one single trajectory of meanings that 
can be captured by such conceptual frames as “sovereignty,” “human rights,” 
“empire,” “development,” “capitalism,” or “progress,” for example. As I will later 
 
9. CARL SCHMITT, DER NOMOS DER ERDE: IM VÖLKERRECHT DES JUS PUBLICUM 
EUROPAEUM (1950); see also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law as Political Theology: How 
to Read Nomos der Erde?, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 492, 505–07 (2004). 
10. WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers trans., De 
Gruyter rev. ed. 2000) (1984). 
11. See, e.g., id. at 575–79. 
12. See, e.g., id. at 296. 
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elaborate in more detail, it is true that it is impossible to write a history of 
international law that would not include a teleological element. But this is not to 
say that there would be a single, natural teleology embedded in history that it 
would be the task of the historian to uncover. On the contrary, individual histories 
tend to be very anti-universal, very concentrated on bringing forth the specific 
standpoint of the historian. This is perhaps easiest to see by the example of 
Belgium’s key role in the field. 
III.  BELGIAN HISTORIES: LAURENT, NYS, DESCAMPS 
In The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, I told the story of how professional 
international law “began” in Belgium in the late 1860s and early 1870s.13 So it is 
also perfectly logical that the first efforts to write professional histories of 
international law came from Belgium and embody a distinctly Belgian point of 
view. Not that long ago, while preparing my own historical work, I found the 
eighteen volumes on the Histoire du droit des gens et des relations internationales 
by Francois Laurent, professor of history in Ghent and Brussels at the time.14 With 
not a little apprehensiveness, taking the first steps in my own work, I opened the 
first of these volumes—but was very soon comforted because there was no way I 
could have undertaken a similar work. For those not (yet?) familiar with Laurent’s 
history, I recommend it to you as a significant timepiece. The first volume dealt 
with the great Middle Eastern empires, the Babylonians and Assyrians, followed 
by volumes on the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Romans. When Laurent got to 
the fourth volume (on Christianity), he wrote in a new preface, relating that his 
friends had been contacting him, pointing out that this was not really the history of 
the law of nations at all, but the history of humanity. Which is why from that point 
onwards, the successive volumes have two title pages, on the left it continues to 
read, Histoire du droit des Gens, but on the right Etudes sur l’histoire de 
l’Humanite—studies on the history of humanity. The change made no difference as 
to the contents. The history of international law is the history of humanity. This, of 
course, is a familiar mindset. 
Laurent’s student and biographer, Ernest Nys, eventually became the first 
historian of the new profession of international law serving as professor of legal 
history in Brussels and writing a series of both larger and specific studies on 
international legal history.15 We remember Nys as one of the group of lawyers and 
intellectuals in the Institut de droit international, the Institute of International Law, 
where modern “professional” international law was forged. But like most Belgian 
members of the Institute, he was also a member of King Leopold’s Conseil 
 
13. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 12–19, 39–41 (2002). 
14. FRANCOIS LAURENT, HISTOIRE DU DROIT DES GENS ET DES RELATIONS 
INTERNATIONALES (1851-1870). 
15. See, e.g., ERNEST NYS, ÉTUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT POLITIQUE 
(Brussels, Alfred Castaigne 1901); ERNEST NYS, LES ORIGINES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
(Brussels, Alfred Castaigne 1894); ERNEST NYS, THE PAPACY CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ponsoby A. Lyons trans., London, Henry Sweet 1879). 
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Supérieur de l’État Indépendant du Congo, the governing council of what was de 
facto King Leopold’s private territory and industrial enterprise. So it was perhaps 
no accident that when, in 1904, he listed forty-five states in the world, of these 
twenty-two were European states; twenty-one American; and the remaining three, 
Japan, Liberia, and the Independent State of the Congo.16 
Another Belgian of the same generation who served as Secretary General of 
the Institut de droit international was Baron Edouard Descamps, whom we have 
two reasons to remember. One is his role as a member of the Committee des 
juristes that drafted the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 
1922—the predecessor of today’s International Court of Justice. According to 
Article 38(3) of the Statute, the court in the Hague should apply “general principles 
of law recognised by civilised nations.”17 Commentaries of the statute treat the 
formulation as “old fashioned” but appreciate its point, namely to open the door for 
the Court to have recourse in its jurisprudence to other sources apart from treaties 
and customs as well. Especially in the early days of the Court, it was far from 
obvious that the materials available to it otherwise would have been sufficient and 
the drafters wanted to avoid authorizing the Court to decide non liquet. From the 
Committee’s records, we will find out that it was Baron Descamps who suggested 
the addition of that set of legal materials—principles joining the legal cultures of 
“civilised nations”—as a part of the “international law” that the Court could use to 
decide cases.18 
But we should also remember Descamps for another fact, namely his having 
published in 1903 a 600-page tract called L’Afrique Nouvelle: Essai sur l’état 
civilisateur dans les pays neufs et sur la Fondation, l’Organisation et le 
Gouvernement de l’État indépendant du Congo, an attack against British 
commercial interests that had schemed to suggest that there was something 
dubious about the civilizing mission in the Congo.19 No doubt Descamps was like 
many Europeans at the time—convinced that colonization and civilization went 
hand in hand, and like most, felt especially attached to colonization by their own 
rulers. For him, no doubt, like for Laurent, the history of international law was the 
history of humanity, and that history, again, largely a narrative of how European 
ideas and men will come to rule humanity. 
This may be a Belgian idea, but it is also a quintessential European idea. The 
view that Europe will “probably legislate eventually for all other continents” is 
given an expressly providential gloss in Kant’s political essays from where it 
 
16. 1 ERNEST NYS, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: LES PRINCIPLES, LES THÉORIES, LES FAITS 
117–18, 126 (1904). 
17. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 38(3), Dec. 16, 1920, 6 
L.N.T.S. 391. 
18. See Am. Ass’n for Int’l Conciliation, The Draft Scheme Of The Permanent Court Of 
International Justice, 157 INT’L CONCILIATION 509, 511–14 (1920). 
19. See generally BARON EDOUARD DESCAMPS, L’AFRIQUE NOUVELLE: ESSAI SUR L'ÉTAT 
CIVILISATEUR DANS LES PAYS NEUFS ET SUR LA FONDATION, L’ORGANISATION ET LE 
GOUVERNEMENT DE L'ÉTAT INDÉPENDANT DU CONGO (Paris, Librairie Hachette 1903). 
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expanded in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the view 
of Europe’s development representing humanity’s future too—a view quite central 
in the intellectual consolidation of international law as an institutional and 
professional practice.20 No wonder that towards the end of the twentieth century 
international law has been felt to carry an intensely Eurocentric heritage. Its 
history, too, has been a history of what Europeans have done or thought in their 
relations with other continents and peoples. 
IV.  EUROCENTRISM 
Traditional histories are terribly Eurocentric.21 European locations such as 
Munster and Osnabruck (Westphalia), Utrecht and Vienna, the Hague, Paris and 
Geneva, are central to the historiography of the field, places where we international 
lawyers find ourselves constantly even today. It is frustratingly difficult, indeed in 
some ways, impossible to do international law without European imaginary, 
without mentioning “Roman law,” “Renaissance,” or “Enlightenment,” for 
example. Or with no reference to such technical principles as the gunshot rule, the 
idea that the coastal state’s maritime belt should be determined by reference to the 
capacity of eighteenth century European military technologies. You cannot write a 
history of international law without recourse to concepts such as jus gentium, 
which immediately take you back to the way imperial Rome imagined its 
commercial relations with foreigners, the people it arrogantly relegated to the 
uniform category of non-citizens of Rome. And what kind of history would it be 
that would not focus on the Napoleonic Wars, the debates on the balance of power 
and “concert” within the Congress of Vienna in 1815? It seems quite impossible to 
write about international legal history without writing the history of what 
Europeans have done and written, how they have imagined Europe, and the 
conduct of its expansion. 
But the problem with traditional histories is not only that the events and 
ideas—the substance of international legal history—tends to be Eurocentric. The 
very standards of historiography are European. To write a credible professional 
history of the field, one needs to adopt European notions of relevance so that even 
a critique of Eurocentrism may appear to arise from European preoccupations and 
political attachments. This is a much more difficult problem to deal with than 
merely seeking to shrug off narratives Europeans have traditionally told. In the 
1960s and 1970s, a first generation of non-European, non-American lawyers, who 
were often active in the United Nations, started to write other kinds of history. I 
mention here R.P. Anand, an Indian diplomat, scholar, and legal historian who 
wrote works on maritime and commercial laws in the East Indies and trade 
contacts between the Moghul Empire and the surrounding communities in the 
Indian subcontinent before and during the early years after the arrival of 
 
20. KANT, IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH A COSMOPOLITAN PURPOSE, supra note 
4, at 52. 
21. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism, 
supra note 3; see also Arnulf Becker Lorca, Eurocentrism in the History of International Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1034. 
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Europeans.22 Another one is Taslim O. Elias, a Nigerian diplomat, a judge at the 
International Court of Justice, and a historian of international treaty relations in the 
Saharan and sub-Saharan worlds before European penetration.23 Those writings 
were enthusiastically received and significantly broadened the disciplinary 
horizons. And yet, it is not hard to grasp why a more recent generation of non-
European, non-American, international lawyers has been reluctant to continue that 
kind of work. Those new histories always tended to suggest the following: that the 
non-Europeans also had international law; that they also thought that treaties were 
binding; that ambassadorial immunities should be honored; and that war should be 
waged according to some minimal rules of humanity. In other words, the silent 
suggestion in those works seemed to be that “we were also Europeans,” that non-
European communities, too, recognized and followed standards that were familiar 
to Europeans, thus perversely confirming what Europeans had always known, 
namely that European standards and more are not really “European” but universal. 
A new generation of postcolonial historians no longer tries to demonstrate that 
non-European peoples also subscribe—and have always subscribed—to standards 
whose authorities are European writers. Instead, they seek to depart from any a 
priori commitment to those standards in the first place. Those standards, and the 
discipline based on them, they suggest, are an aspect of European colonization. 
Instead of showing how everybody has actually accepted its principles, what needs 
to be demonstrated is how, precisely, they have been imposed on everyone so as to 
support European domination. Tony Anghie’s now classic Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law has inspired many other studies 
in the past decade whose point has not been to write about international law as a 
civilizing project or an instrument of humanitarian progress, but as stories of 
enslavement and the destruction of indigenous ways of life across the world—the 
universalization of a commercially drawn technological empire.24 
The problem, these new histories seem to be suggesting, is that it is 
impossible to write international legal histories—or indeed to participate in 
international law in present professional or academic institutions—without doing 
this through a vocabulary and a set of techniques and understandings that are 
accomplices to a history of European domination. To participate in these 
Eurocentric practices—to accept that engagement in the diplomatic or academic 
debates is possible only through such practices—is to perpetuate that history and to 
close avenues for thinking and acting in other ways, to prevent imagining other 
 
22. R.P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HISTORY: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 
(2004). 
23. TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1972). 
24. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 23–28 (2005); see also NATHANIEL BERMAN, PASSION AND AMBIVALENCE: COLONIALISM, 
NATIONALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2012) [hereinafter BERMAN, PASSION AND 
AMBIVALENCE]; Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalisme du droit international et impérialisme : le 
vrai faux paradoxe du droit international?, in 13 IMPÉRIALISME ET DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN 
EUROPE ET AUX ÉTATS-UNIS 15, 18–21 (Emmanuelle Jouannet & Hélène Ruiz Fabri eds., 2007). 
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futures for the world than those opened up by Laurent, Kant, and other European 
thinkers. And yet, it seems difficult to suddenly invent new vocabularies—or to 
replace constructive imagination by nostalgic retreat that celebrates the ways of 
life of native communities before the arrival of the Europeans. Postcolonial critics 
seem to be stuck between two strategies: either to accept the universality of the 
inherited standards and to concentrate on a demonstration of European 
hypocrisy—to show that Europeans never complied by those standards 
themselves—or to reject those standards and to indict international law as an 
accomplice to imperial domination. Some good work has been done on both sides 
since the 1980s, but two problems especially remain: what one should replace the 
existing vocabulary with and how to avoid subscribing to a naive realism for which 
international law is merely a superstuctural veil over the relations of power? The 
intellectual agreement between postcolonial history and the imperial narratives of 
Grewe and Schmitt may or may not be a cause of concern. But it seems obvious 
that legal realism, as the basis of one’s legal history, is not prone to nuanced 
narratives about the functioning of the law/power nexus. 
The history of international law seems poised between two alternatives. Either 
to operate with the inherited vocabularies and seek to deal with the problems that 
arise from their association with dubious political causes as best one can, or to 
reject those vocabularies outright, and then to seek to replace them with something 
more congenial. Each alternative has an aspect of reductionism that makes it hard 
to recommend them as prima facie better or worse. Each has vital lessons to give to 
but also the propensity to turn into an intellectual trap, blinding adherents to 
history’s ironies and ruptures, its counter-intuitive turns and contradictions. 
In a recent work, I have tried to outline four strategies with which colleagues 
have tried to cope with Eurocentrism while avoiding full commitment to either of 
the alternatives.25 One is to simply tell the story of international law’s engagement 
with specific colonial and imperial projects; the facts are often gruesome enough to 
shock the interlocutor into an anti-colonial consciousness. This is what the 
Leyenda negra purported to accomplish in the hands of Protestants such as 
William of Orange or Hugo Grotius, while simultaneously turning attention away 
from the colonial policies of their countries. There are innumerable moments 
where rhetoric of law or rights has accompanied imperial pursuits. Think of the 
way the rights of man in Paris were accompanied with the greatest number of the 
importation of slaves in Haiti around 1790, for example, or the reluctance with 
which the members of the National Assembly moved to end slavery—and even 
then only temporarily—in the French Caribbean. Or think of the turn to formal 
empire from the 1870s onwards, the enthusiasm with which international lawyers 
greeted the rule of King Léopold in the Congo in 1885, or their silence when 
Italian planes were spreading poison gas over Abyssinia in 1936. It is often 
sufficient to merely lay out the facts. (Though we are probably not as easily 
shocked today as people once upon a time—but cynicism is too large a theme to be 
treated here). The question about whether the law should be indicted, or the 
 
25. See generally Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism, 
supra note 3. 
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lawyers, can be left for later, when the complexity of the moment may be duly 
acknowledged. Did the law actually support colonization in this way; were the 
lawyers really united in their view of what the law said—and what influence did 
they have? Is the law, as Nathaniel Berman’s “genealogist” would like to know, 
the Captain or the Imperial Valet, and whether the roles of the two sometimes get 
reversed?26 
A second strategy is to point to the colonial origins of this or that institution 
that has customarily been thought of as originally “European.” Sovereignty and 
property are typical; the content of each has been crucially forged in a colonial 
context so as to either include or exclude forms of indigenous chiefdom or 
possession. Anghie’s work on imperialism poses the good question about whether 
international law as a whole was born out of the colonization of non-European 
territories.27 Without the encounter in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
Europeans would easily have been able to construct their relations under the old 
principle of jus gentium, perhaps modernized into a Droit public de l’Europe, built 
on local European customs, forms of faith, and political community. A third way to 
do historical work, without presupposing the existence of a homogeneous 
European project of colonization by law that would then have to be either endorsed 
in principle—against European hypocrisy—or flatly rejected in a single act of 
postcolonial defiance, is to think in terms of hybrids of colonial and anti-colonial 
ideas and uses of the inherited vocabulary. Whatever the origin or content of 
principal notions of international law, many of those notions have been used in 
innovative ways also to support anti-colonial ideologies or practices. Sovereignty, 
national self-determination, binding force of treaties, and the idea of inalienable 
human rights are all rather obvious examples of notions that have travelled far and 
wide and have found supporters and adversaries in the most varied quarters. There 
is new work, for example, on how jurists from the third or the “semiperipheral” 
world have used traditional legal concepts to buttress their states against European 
powers in Latin America, Asia, and northern Africa.28 International legal concepts 
are like any other legal notions—indeterminate as to their content and amenable 
for use for a number of contradictory causes. During the 1960s and 1970s, calls for 
the “permanent sovereignty over natural resources” (PSNR) were made also in 
terms of legal equity and sovereign equality, with stress on responsibility for 
former deprivation and injustice.29 The story of that initiative’s fate and of the even 
more ambitious “New International Economic Order” project, which did not 
succeed in its most important goals—though some achievements were attained—
constitutes an excellent illustration of the possibilities and perils of engagement in 
 
26. BERMAN, PASSION AND AMBIVALENCE, supra note 24, at 41, 45. 
27. ANGHIE, supra note 24, at 13–15. 
28. See, e.g., Nathaniel Berman, ‘The Appeals of the Orient’: Colonized Desire and the War 
of the Riff, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 195, 223–29 (Karen Knop ed., 2004); ARNULF 
BECKER LORCA, MESTIZO INTERNATIONAL LAW: A GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, 1850–
1950 (forthcoming 2013); Liliana Obregón, Between Civilisation and Barbarism: Creole 
Interventions in International Law, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 815, 820–24 (2006). 
29. ANGHIE, supra note 24, at 216, 317. 
ARTICLE J KOSKENNIEMI 3/17/14  4:22 PM 
226 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. [27.2 
legal reform in existing institutions.30 No doubt, more work should be done about 
what happened with those pursuits. Finally, a fourth strategy is to follow Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s advice in order to “provincialise Europe.”31 This means giving up 
the habit, learned from Laurent and Kant, and followed on to practically all 
twentieth century international legal history of thinking of European stories as the 
universal stories; world history as the history of European expansion; and the 
history of political and legal ideas as the narrative of European men having 
conversations across history over themes and concepts with a universal purport. 
Instead of thinking of the history of international law as “histoire de l’humanité” 
(Laurent), one could think of it as a “project” of a limited number of men to exert 
political influence or gather material resources in specific contexts. I sometimes 
think of my own The Gentle Civilizer of Nations in these terms, as an effort to 
bring international law down from epochal or conceptual abstractions and think of 
it in human terms, as a set of legal initiatives by men who defined themselves as 
authorities in the field and therefore had much to gain if indeed they might 
succeed. One could, in other words, seek to contextualize the uses of international 
legal vocabularies by reference to what it is that their native speakers have wanted 
to attain by them—such as, furthering the cause of a colonial company; buttressing 
the international status of one’s own country; trying to work for or against the 
expansion of trade; or simply as an instrument for the political influence of one’s 
employers. It is quite normal for lawyers to have clients and to plead for them. It is 
only international law’s ideological ballast as representative of something greater 
that has made its historians too reluctant to bring it down to the human size. But I 
believe signs of a change in that regard are emerging. 
V.  VITORIA AND US: DEALING WITH ANACHRONISM 
Two weeks ago, I attended a conference in Madrid on the legacy of Francisco 
de Vitoria, the Spanish Dominican cleric whose works on the Indies and on the 
laws of war have had great influence on later generations. The conference speakers 
often referred to Vitoria as “a great jurist” or an “activist in human rights” from 
whose humanitarian and “anti-imperial” positions we would have much to learn. 
This, by now commonplace way of addressing the Spanish second scholastic, is 
rather obviously anachronistic. What might Vitoria, prima professor of theology at 
Salamanca, have thought if he had learned that he would be downgraded as a 
“jurist” or addressed as a “human rights scholar” in a world where the expression 
“human rights” made no sense in either the Latin or Spanish languages and ideas 
that we associate with freedom in a secular community were frankly heretical? 
Vitoria, after all, was in favor of burning heretics! How should one react to the 
routine projection of present concepts, vocabularies, and biases onto people of 
other ages and other concerns? Surely, anachronism shuts our ears to what Vitoria 
was actually trying to convey to his Salamanca audience. Surely, we owe it to 
 
30. See generally SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 103−59 (2011). 
31. See generally DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL 
THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2000). 
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Vitoria to try to understand him on his terms, instead of ours. 
But most twentieth century international legal history operates precisely in the 
contrary way. It takes our present concepts and institutions as its starting points 
and works backwards to sketch a “tradition” operating as a conversation across 
generations over such familiar topics as sovereignty, diplomacy, treaties, 
humanitarian limits to warfare and so on, gradually gaining maturity in our present 
institutions, the United Nations, or the human rights treaty mechanisms. Historians 
rarely nowadays think in these terms. They have learned to be wary of 
“precursoritis,” the view of the past as significant predominantly as precursor to 
the present. To think in terms of “traditions” flattens history and erases its ruptures, 
transformations, and incommunicabilities. It may even be a wholly imaginary, 
violent way to fuse together persons and moments as different as an Italian 
Protestant at Oxford in late-sixteenth century (Gentili); a Spanish counter-
reformation intellectual (Vitoria); a Dutch eclectic working for a trade company 
(Grotius); and a Huguenot littérateur looking for a job in eighteenth century 
Neuchâtel (Vattel). These men were concerned over political affairs on a rather 
wide scale—but their concerns and contexts, their “projects,” were otherwise 
widely different and hardly comprehensible in terms of their contribution to a 
“tradition” that came to fruition only long after they had left the scene. 
The majority of Anglo-American historians today regard anachronism to be a 
mortal sin.32 Historiography—especially study of legal and political thought—
should not extract its subjects from their chronological contexts as may befit some 
contemporary project. It should read such subjects as against the debates and 
struggles that belonged to the world where they lived and produced their works. 
Or, as stated by the most famous of the contextual historians, Quentin Skinner, 
historical texts or events ought to be studied by asking the question about what the 
author of a text or agent intended to achieve by the text or the act in view of the 
linguistic conventions available and the audience to which it was directed. The 
objective of the process should be to understand the intention of the agent by 
locating the text or the act in the place and time of its production.33 In this—
“historicist”—view every idea is a product of the moment where it is born and 
operates. It emerges from the concerns of the period and lives through often 
polemical engagement with other ideas adjoining it at the time. Ideas do not have 
trans-historical meanings. They are part of vocabularies and systems of thought 
that emerge in particular periods, flourish and die. Their meaning is completely 
tied up with those systems and cannot be grasped separately from them. 
A contextual reading of Vitoria, then, would look very different from most 
contemporary accounts. It would highlight that his lectures on the Indians or on 
just war were composed in the context of teaching future clerics on the 
management of the sacrament of penance.34 The proper intellectual context would 
 
32. I am inspired, however, by Anne Orford’s defence of anachronism. See Anne Orford, 
On International Legal Method, 1 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 166, 170–77 (2013). 
33. 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS: REGARDING METHOD 86–87 (2002). 
34. Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution, 61 
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not at all be a tradition of international law but the “Second Part of the Second 
Part” of the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas that deals with the virtue of 
justice—and not “law”—and opens into a series of questions and answers about 
the conditions of absolution that confessors ought to bear in mind. They were also 
given publicly as summaries of a rather wider series of lectures that dealt with such 
other aspects of justice as restoration, the rights of property and exchange, just 
price, and usury, that had immediate relevance for thinking about two important 
points of concern for theologians at the moment: the expansion of a commercial 
culture in Europe and in imperial lands and the standards of behavior Christians 
ought to follow when dealing with non-Christians.35 But almost none of this 
context has ever been included in legal histories celebrating Vitoria as a “founder” 
of international law. Instead, Vitoria’s image has been overlain by anachronistic 
images about international legality and human rights protection. Almost no 
attention has been given to Vitoria as a Counter-Reformation intellectual, worried 
about Luther’s expanding influence and the theological reforms that his colleague 
and friend Domingo de Soto was advancing at the Council of Trent—which he 
could not personally attend owing to ill health—and concerned over the state of the 
souls of commercial men like the Spanish cambistas in Antwerp who asked for a 
second opinion from Vitoria in 1530 about whether their professional activities 
were sinful, and if so, what they could do about the matter.36 Vitoria did not have a 
direct response, and we can imagine that it must have been the letter, and the 
changing world from which it emerged, that inspired him to devote such 
meticulous attention to the justice of commercial exchanges, as well as to rights of 
property and jurisdiction, to natural law and the jus gentium in his lectures in 
Salamanca. 
If apart from the readings by Annabel Brett and Richard Tuck,37 Vitoria has 
so far not been the object of wider contextual studies in the Anglophone world, this 
is not the case with the Protestant political activist Hugo Grotius, especially in 
regards to his work as legal advisor to the Dutch East India Company in the early 
years of the seventeenth century. His large work, De jure praedae, which was 
unearthed from his Nachlass only in the nineteenth century, has been meticulously 
situated in context by Martine van Ittersum while others have read his theological 
texts with close attention to their reception in the predominantly puritan milieu of 
the Dutch rebellion.38 Another contextual work is that on Alberico Gentili by 
 
U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 13 (2011). 
35. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, COMENTARIOS A LA SECUNDA SECUNDAE DE SANTO 
TOMÁS (Vicente Beltrán de Heredia ed., 1932). 
36. See generally MARJORIE GRICE-HUTCHINSON, THE SCHOOL OF SALAMANCA: 
READINGS IN SPANISH MONETARY THEORY 1544–1605, at 38–58 (1952). 
37. ANNABEL BRETT, LIBERTY, RIGHT AND NATURE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LATER 
SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT 124–40 (1997); RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 51–77 (1999); 
see also ANTHONY PAGDEN, THE FALL OF NATURAL MAN: THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE 
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38. HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY (Martine Julia van 
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Diego Panizza that has discussed the works of this Bartolist jurist as a member of 
the “war party” in the England of Elizabeth I and a target of religious criticisms by 
the puritan members of the Oxford law faculty.39 More recently, that bastion of 
universalist ideologies, human rights, has also been subjected to contextual 
readings by Samuel Moyn40 and others. These works are perhaps still not read by 
international lawyers to the extent one would hope, but I have no doubt that they 
will in the future contribute to undermining the ideologies of progress that have 
been an ineradicable part of international legal history. 
VI.  THE LIMITS OF CONTEXTUALISM 
But even as contextualism opens an enlightening avenue for the examination 
of past legal and political worlds, it is not without its difficulties. In particular, it 
tends to rely on a “positivist” separation between the past and the present that 
encourages historical relativism, indeed an outright uncritical attitude that may end 
up suppressing efforts to find patterns in history that might account for today’s 
experiences of domination and injustice.41 Suggesting that the past is literally 
“another country” whose mores and thinking can only be uncovered with the 
greatest difficulty and whose conceptual schemes, once uncovered, cannot be 
submitted to criticisms by standards based on today’s “value-systems” is to attack 
both the progressivist narratives of the traditionalists as well as the postcolonial 
critiques of international law’s involvement with empire and colonization. Both 
before and after Anghie, critical lawyers have pointed to how Vitoria’s way of 
dealing with the Indians subordinated them under a theological vocabulary that 
justified Europeans’ disciplining them.42 From the perspective of a rigorous 
contextualism, however, attacking Vitoria as a legitimizer of colonialism would 
mean that “some standards of historiographical analysis have been abandoned.”43 
In a sustained discussion of the matter, Ian Hunter has noted that both sides in the 
controversy over Vitoria’s legacy have utilized “a global principle of justice 
capable of including European and non-European peoples within the ‘universal 
 
IN THE EAST INDIES (1595–1615) (2006). 
39. DIEGO PANIZZA, ALBERICO GENTILI, GIURISTA IDEOLOGO NELL'INGHILTERRA 
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40. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010). 
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discussion is, however, much more influenced by Anne Orford, The Past as Law or History? The 
Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law, in TIERS-MONDE: BILAN ET 
PERSPECTIFS (Emmanuelle Jouannet & Hélène Ruiz-Fabri eds., forthcoming 2013) and Orford, 
supra note 32, at 170–77. 
42. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 96–108 (1992); José-Manuel Barreto, Imperialism 
and Decolonization as Scenarios of Human Rights History, in HUMAN RIGHTS FROM A THIRD 
WORLD PERSPECTIVE: CRITIQUE, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 140, 144–51 (José-
Manuel Barreto ed., 2013). 
43. Pablo Zapatero, Legal Imagination in Vitoria. The Power of Ideas, 11 J. HIST. INT’L L. 
221, 271 (2009). 
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history’ of [the] unfolding [of jus gentium].”44 In so doing they have—falsely—
upgraded their own locally-determined biases and preconceptions into universal 
standards that they then impose on others. But to operate with anything like 
“universal justice” or a “historical tradition” is to neglect the chronologically 
delimited sense in which historical agents and their works and texts ought to be 
understood. It is to commit the sin of anachronism. 
However, it has long been known that a clear separation between the object of 
historical research and the researcher’s own context cannot be sustained; that the 
study of history is unavoidably—and fruitfully—conditioned by the historian’s 
prejudices and pre-understandings, conceptual frames and interest of knowledge. 
“Historians,” Michel de Certeau has observed, “begin from present determinations. 
Current events are their real beginning.”45 The point about the intermingling of the 
object-vocabulary with the historian’s own vocabulary has been often made, but 
there is perhaps reason to remind ourselves of its importance for critical study of 
law and history. The answers we receive from history are dependent on the 
questions we pose—those questions, again, being dependent on our present 
projects, our understandings and pre-understandings, including where we believe 
the present is leading us now. As Hans-Georg Gadamer used to stress, “History is 
only present to us in light of our futurity.”46 This is precisely what we see when our 
present problems with “globalization” lead us to examine the past of our inherited 
legal concepts and institutions.  
It is important to respond to concerns about anachronism because many of 
them are so obviously relevant for international legal historiography. It is true that 
present concerns ought not to prevent us from trying to understand past legal texts 
or events in their context. On the other hand, complete freedom from anachronism 
is impossible—positivism is still mistaken. All historical study can—in fact, 
must—rely on is the historian’s own pre-understanding and techniques. The point 
is that this fact ought not to make the historian unable to hear the voice of the past 
and engage in a critical contact—“dialogue” if one wishes—with it. Let me make 
briefly two arguments. First, the kind of “pure” contextualism that stresses the 
limitation to historical work to the description of past contexts or “conceptual 
schemes” cannot succeed on its own terms. Choice and evaluation are necessarily 
part of history as much as any other study, perhaps in an especially intense way in 
history. And second, the choices and evaluations which enable the historian to 
engage with the past ought to reflect an effort to attain a better understanding of 
the nature of the present, including the causes of today’s domination and injustice, 
in order to contribute to their eradication. I have no problem with the old Marxian 
view that the validation of propositions about the world cannot depend on the 
correspondence of those propositions with some (non-propositional) state of 
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affairs, but how they contribute to what, for lack of a better word, can be called 
human emancipation. Commenting on this view Hayden White has noted: 
We apprehend the past and the whole spectacle of history-in-general in 
terms of felt needs and aspirations that are ultimately personal, having to 
do with the ways we view our own positions in the ongoing social 
establishment, our hopes and fears for the future, and the image of the 
kind of humanity we would like to believe we represent.47 
The limits of contextualism become most clearly visible in efforts to define what 
the “context” for a historical text or an event is. Is it that of writing books or 
making claims and counterclaims within some diplomatic or military dispute? 
What role do the institutions and traditions of academic life play for the assessment 
of the contribution of a jurist, and can those institutions be understood without 
regard to wider histories of the university in Europe, the rise of professional 
disciplines and their role in the formation of the modern (European) State? And 
then there are large questions raised by Ellen Meiksins Wood at the outset of her 
recent series of volumes on the history of political thought. Many historians, she 
complains, appear to concentrate only on the intellectual context—the texts 
produced by the historical agent, his or her relations to colleagues, correspondence, 
and activity within some intellectual or political institution.48 In all this history, she 
observes, there is very little “substantive consideration of agriculture, the 
aristocracy and peasantry, land distribution and tenure, the social division of 
labour, social protest and conflict, population, urbanization, trade, commerce, 
manufacture, and the burgher class.”49 
In the history of international law, too, there are large questions to be posed 
about the cultural, political, and economic role of law and lawyers that have to do 
with the shifting position of the systems of knowledge represented by theology, 
politics, and economics. Although it is necessary that a study of Vitoria take 
account of his work as commentary on the Summa Theologiae, a proper account of 
that activity, again, ought to encompass some discussion of the dogmatic history of 
Catholic theology, including the nominalist challenge that Vitoria confronted 
during his apprenticeship in Paris. But it should also consider the suppression of 
the comuneros rebellion in 1519-1521 in Northern Castile that shook the political 
consciousness of the contemporaries, and whose lesson was recorded in the strong 
appeal for social discipline in Vitoria’s 1528 relectio on civil power.50 Nor should 
it overlook the massive expansion of commerce following the entry of silver from 
the Indies into the networks of trade that challenged religious attitudes and 
dramatically undermined Church doctrine.51 But further, surely the “context” of 
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Vitoria cannot be strictly limited to the moment when he lived; after all, that period 
was situated “inside” such larger chunks of history that are usually labeled “the 
rise of capitalism,” “renaissance conscience,” “the Reformation,” or “the rise and 
fall of the Habsburg empire,” together with hypotheses about the causal relations 
between such large items. While it is important to read Vitoria “in context,” that is 
merely a preliminary to the work of determination of what the appropriate context 
is. There is no a priori reason to think that chronology would provide the decisive 
standard instead of, say, some longue durée assumption about the role of “organic 
intellectuals” or relations between religion and state power. Points relevant for 
reading Vitoria include the nature of Spanish imperialism, its effect on Castilian 
peasantry, events taking place in the German realm—the use of Protestantism to 
support the independence of territorial polities—and the way easing the prohibition 
of usury would facilitate the expansion of international commerce by legitimizing 
long-distance credit operations, for example.52 
Now the simple point is, of course, that none of such “contexts” appears 
automatically on the legal historian’s screen. They reflect the historian’s choice—
and that choice is obviously dependent on some criteria of relevance that enables 
the historian to produce a meaningful narrative out of the mass of texts and events 
of which the past consists. It does not require more than a casual glance at 
twentieth century historiography to realize that the criteria of relevance have varied 
enormously and radically; types of historical explanation have come and have gone 
as methodological debates among historians have proceeded—those debates again 
reflecting larger contextual changes in contemporary understandings of the role of 
ideas and facts, psychological causalities, and material transformations in 
producing what to us appears as the real historical context where we live. It is 
impossible, but also largely unnecessary, to press upon the point that the stories of 
the past we tell always reflect our present concerns, that every history is a history 
of the present. 
VII.  CHOOSING SCOPE AND SCALE 
With those last remarks, let me make a few final points on how any account 
of international law’s past is necessarily and fruitfully embedded in contemporary 
concerns and preferences and participating in present-day debates and disputes. 
Because those debates often have political implications, it is especially useful for 
accounts that aim to possess a critical edge to be aware of them and to learn to use 
them in intelligent ways. I will summarize the remarks, following Christopher 
Tomlins, by references to choices of scope and scale that are involved in the study 
of international legal history.53 
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As for the determination of the scope of one’s historical work, there are a 
number of jurisprudential choices that need to be made at the outset that reflect on 
what kind of account one is going to produce. I already pointed to two alternative 
ways to examine international law’s past: (1) an “idealist” approach that examines 
the past through “ideas,” “rules,” or “principles” that appear in canonical texts or 
can be detached from relevant events or practices; and (2) a “realist” approach that 
examines imperial policies, economic or military power. The former embodies a 
traditional way of writing international legal history, but it is premised on a 
definition of “law” that has been highly contested. A whole “realist” tradition, 
from French sixteenth century historical jurisprudence onward, rejects imagining 
law as abstract ideas and instead proposes to shift attention to past practices and 
the uses of social power. Both Hobbesian “realism” and the critique by the 
nineteenth century historicists of enlightenment universalism embody alternative 
ways of understanding law as the part of the life of a community, an aspect of its 
practices and relations of power. In the middle of the twentieth century, such 
realisms proliferated to seek the presence of the law “in operation” in patterns of 
administrative or judicial decision-making, the consciousness of legally qualified 
professionals, or ideologies of legitimacy embodied in a society’s hegemonic 
structures. The works by Schmitt or Grewe emanated from such criticisms, as do 
the works of many postcolonial scholars attacking international law by associating 
it with the opprobrium of colonialism and imperialism.54 
Choosing the scope of one’s history requires, among other things, a choice 
between either examining legal or philosophical texts produced at academies, 
professional acts and instruments from public administrations and foreign 
ministries, or then focusing on economic interactions and interests, the 
development of military technology, or the strategies of balance of power. How 
should one define the scope of one’s history—should it be a history of thinking or 
acting, a history of rules or practices? The great interest international lawyers have 
had with the laws of the Spanish empire in the Americas in the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries manifest each. If the scope of one’s study is focused on the 
lectures given by the Dominican scholars in Salamanca, the resulting account will 
look very different than if one examines what was going on in Mexico or Peru at 
the time among the conquistadors or the encomenderos. For instance, the title of 
Lewis Hanke’s classic account, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of 
America, already delimits the scope of his work by heavy normative tilt.55 The 
events, it suggests, are significant inasmuch as they illustrate the “struggle for 
justice” waged by (some) Spaniards in the course of the conquest—a kind of 
antidote to the famous title of Las Casas’ Short Account of the Destruction of the 
Indies. 
 
OF L. & SOC. SCI. 31 (2012). 
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One could try to overcome the definitional quandary (is international law 
better seen as ideas or power?) by the jurisprudential compromise to think of the 
law as an “institutional fact,” an amalgam of ideologies and practices. But would 
one then focus on academic or military institutions, and what about the relations 
between economic institutions—forms of property and contract—and institutions 
of public law and administration—sovereignty and constitutional forms? I make 
these points not to show that it is impossible to do historical work, but that, before 
such work can start in international law, some very consequential choices have to 
be made about what the “law” is that will determine the scope of the study. Let us 
say someone wants to do research in international law in the eighteenth century. 
The chronological scope of such research might be defended by the argument that, 
during the Enlightenment, important developments took place in ideas about and 
practices of statehood, international trade, warfare, and in the overall ideologies of 
political and legal legitimacy. One might contest this by arguing that such a 
definition is completely Eurocentric—“Enlightenment,” “rights of man,” and 
“balance of power” were aspects of European debates and ideologies and instead 
focus on the expansion of the slave trade in the same century, or the process 
leading up to Haiti’s independence in 1804 in which the National Assembly did its 
best to limit the Déclaration de droits de l’homme et du citoyen to mainland 
France. 
But even if one wished to remain inside the old, Eurocentric scope of 
international legal histories of that period, there would still remain charged issues 
to be resolved. In traditional histories, the work by Immanuel Kant on 
cosmopolitan law figures as a limit case. Is Kant’s Perpetual Peace a work in 
international law or is it not?56 If it is, then international law is defined in part as 
philosophy—but why would Christian Garve’s sharp anti-idealist work on the 
difference between private morality and the morality of statesmanship—to which 
Kant was in part reacting—be then left outside?57 After all, it was much closer in 
spirit and practical conclusions to the work on Staatsklugheit by influential 
German professors of law of nature and of nations, such as Johann Hieronymus 
Gundling or Gottfried Achenwall. Is Hobbes a part of the (intellectual) tradition of 
the law of nations? If he is (as most would concede), then surely the tradition of 
ragion di stato, inaugurated by the Counter-reformation activist Giovanni Botero 
at the turn of the seventeenth century, would also have to be included in the history 
of international law?58 I have elsewhere argued that international law is a “German 
discipline.”59 To make that argument, I have included the very powerful German 
 
56. See generally KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH, in POLITICAL 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 93. 
57. See generally CHRISTIAN GARVE, ABHANDLUNG ÜBER DIE VERBINDUNG DER MORAL 
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58. See generally GIOVANNI BOTERO, THE REASON OF STATE (P. J. Waley & D. P. Waley 
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public law into the history of international law—Pufendorf, Thomasius, 
Achenwall, Jellinek, Schmitt, Kelsen . . . . Again, I recognize this is a contestable 
choice. Making it will make the history of international law look very different 
from narratives where Emer de Vattel and such French littérateurs as Abbé de 
Saint Pierre or Jean-Jacques Rousseu play a large role. Either way, the choice will 
determine whether one understands international law as a governmental project of 
managing external relations or a debate on “perpetual peace” by intellectuals. And 
is Adam Smith part of the history of international law? The least one can say is that 
defining the field so as to exclude him would participate in the colossal 
“forgetting” in much of international legal history of the influence of economic 
thinking—and this despite the fact that some of the basics of that thinking are to be 
found in the subjective right vocabularies of men unquestionably included in the 
canon (such as Vitoria or Grotius).60 
Finally, one can say that delimiting international legal history to accounts 
about kings and wars and balance of power tends to remain a big problem, 
especially as it ignores the close relationship that has always existed between 
sovereignty and property, public and private law in external government and 
empire. This is why, in my recent work, I have tried to delimit the scope of 
“international law” in such a way as to include the development of private law 
rules on ownership and contracts and to look closely at the operation of trade 
companies from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries as instances where the 
cooperation between the two is most clearly visible. Again, I find it astonishing 
that the global laws of the economy have not been subjected to study by 
international lawyers—even as it is clear that everything about the economy is 
built on legal rules and practices of enforcement, as institutional economists 
readily concede.61 That the market is not, and has never been, independent from 
public power, but, contrarily, the effect of constant state intervention has not 
inspired international legal historians so far to examine how this cooperation has 
taken place. Yet, signs of a change in this respect are visible.62 And it is not at all 
wrong to assume that this change in the scope of international legal history is 
wholly inspired by a contemporary concern to make sense of the operations and 
morality of what is now called globalization. 
Alongside the determination of the scope of one’s history, there is also the 
question of its scale. Histories of international law have tended to encompass large, 
even global, wholes that are supposed to determine the substance of the 
international laws of a period, such as the “Spanish,” “French,” or “British” 
“epochs” discussed by Grewe. I am a great admirer of universal history of the kind 
 
CONCEPTUAL HIST. 45 (2011). 
60. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, The Political Theology of Trade Law, supra note 52, at 95–101. 
61. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN 
WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 17–18 (1973). 
62. See, e.g., Doreen Lustig, International Law and the Business Enterprise (March 2011) 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, New York University). 
ARTICLE J KOSKENNIEMI 3/17/14  4:22 PM 
236 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. [27.2 
that Fernand Braudel has produced,63 slightly less so the work of Immanuel 
Wallerstein.64 Their big structural narratives about European expansion have 
tremendous power to explain things to us, including explaining the nature and 
effect of law in the world. But those scholars had very little, almost nothing, to say 
about the law. On the other hand, for the very reasons that contextual historians 
have highlighted, the ambition of global history tends to be overly generalizing, 
and integrating law in it might easily build on dubious assumptions about its causal 
relations with the social world. Besides, it is surely not the only wide-angle lens we 
can take to examine international law. Other alternatives might be class or religion, 
and although the relevance of both, or at least the latter, has been widely 
recognized, there are still rather few historical studies using them as starting points. 
What would be the appropriate scale on which to examine the work of an 
individual such as Alberico Gentili? What weight should be given to the fact that 
he was born in Italy and had studied Roman law in the Bartolist vein? The (large) 
fact of religion, that he became a Protestant refugee in England, must surely play 
some role in a contextualization of his works but precisely what? And how 
important might it be to focus sharply on the Oxford environment, his struggles 
with his Puritan adversaries at a time of the production of his most important texts? 
Such considerations have often been included in discussions of his achievement, 
and in them, the scale keeps changing from large to small, epochal to personal, 
geographic to ideological. Clearly, the fact that he was a jurist operating during the 
“Spanish epoch” might be relevant in understanding his famous appeal for the 
silence of the theologians in matters of law. Or was that call made in an intra-
Protestant schism? Is the proper large scale that of “Spanish imperial expansion”—
or the struggle against counter-reformation?65 It seems likely that we can choose 
the appropriate wide lens only once we have grasped in a narrow focus, Gentili, the 
individual, writing in a specific place at a specific moment. But the choice of the 
place and the moment cannot be uninfluenced by what we know about the general 
context and so on. The narrative moves back and forth between a wider and a 
narrower scale in order to gradually come to a clearer view of its object. 
It is an almost unthinking practice of international lawyers today to adopt a 
global scale, no doubt in part owing to the predominance of earlier biographical 
studies in the field. But my first contact with the subject was through a textbook 
with the title (in Finnish) “Finland’s International Law.”66 There is an important 
sense in which the proper scale for a history of international law is that of the 
nation, and I have already said that some of the best German works on the subject 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries regarded it as “external public law” 
(“äusseres Staatsrecht”). The scale here is that of the nation’s foreign policy as 
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seen from the foreign ministry—the domestic laws and treaty-arrangements that 
regulate the conduct of external relations. This is a very close relation to the—also 
German—idea or ideology about the primacy of foreign policy, whose nationalist 
implications seem objectionable to many international lawyers. Whether “Foreign 
Relations Law” is or is not included in an international law course tells much of 
the ideological orientation of the professor making the proposal. And yet, to depict 
international law as part of a country’s legal arsenal goes a long way to produce 
one important truth about it. 
There are, of course, formidable philosophical difficulties in the opposite 
choices of scale offered by available alternatives—the wide-angle of “global 
history,” mid-level “national history,” and the limited scope of biography—that 
have to do with the tools of understanding available to present observers. The 
vocabularies of political causation, that seem needed for the production of wide-
angle explanations, have to date dominated diplomatic history and the associated 
“realisms.” Here we see empires, large states, powerful statesmen, and their jurists 
as the principal actors of our narratives. Such histories have been challenged as 
lacking a sociological grasp on what it is that makes empires or state 
representatives “tick”—how they operate in relation to other social forces. Justin 
Rosenberg, Benno Teschke, and Ellen Meiksins Wood each have contested the 
predominance of an exclusively political focus on the international world.67 What 
about the role of social classes, and forms of production in the formation of the 
agents and relationships even at a global scale? Does the “international” at all 
constitute a meaningful whole that we can examine independently of the social or 
economic forces that seem to account for such important aspects of the way the 
world has come about? If it is true, as Teschke argues that “[t]he constitution, 
operation, and transformation of international relations are fundamentally 
governed by social property relations,”68 then this must surely occasion a shift of 
focus in the writing of international legal history. It should now discard the 
distinction between public law and private law so as to bring into view how 
notions of property and contract, the structures of family law, inheritance and 
succession, as well as the corporate form have developed over time. It is one of the 
greatest problems of past histories of international law that they have chosen the 
scale of the state and traced the trajectories of “sovereignty” only—whereas the 
global network of property relations, thoroughly legalized as these are, would have 
made them see much further and deeper. Although social history has now entered 
the world of international relations, no comparable turn has appeared yet in 
international law. China Miéville’s Marxist account of international legal history is 
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so far the most accomplished effort to take seriously the social determination of 
aspects of the international political world, including international law, though the 
jury is still out on the usefulness of the “commodity-form-theory” as the proper 
explanatory frame.69 But the scarcity of legal debates about this point is 
disappointing. 
To start on this, something might still be said for depicting the history of 
international law as the history of legal ideologies. Despite the attacks suffered by 
the notion in recent decades, it may still be useful in capturing what jurisprudence 
has sometimes dealt with in terms the “judge’s legal ideology,” the complex of 
presuppositions about the world received through legal training, by the integration 
in a class and profession of jurists, especially international jurists.70 There are 
already many accounts of the works and contexts of legal advisors of governments, 
of officials, and activists of international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations that might allow the delineation of something like the “ideology of 
competent international lawyers,” a specific “sensibility” that might unite the 
concerns of the history of legal thought with the study of social history. It seems 
obvious that the relative absence of debates on ius gentium in Britain until the mid-
nineteenth century was occasioned at least in part by the specific outlook of 
English jurists predisposed to view the world through a combination of 
commercial laws and the crown’s imperial prerogatives to which the absence of 
adoption of Roman law added something. In the absence of other vocabulary for 
addressing the specificity of the outlook of English jurists, product of a complex 
contextualization, the notion of “ideology” might usefully contrast that world to 
those of the universities of Prussia-Brandenburg at a time when central European 
statecraft began to cope with the challenges of what appeared an increasingly 
autonomous sphere of “the economy.” Here, “ideology” and “sensibility” would 
become meeting-points for history of thought and social causation, just flexible or 
porous enough to account for both punctual and differential history, the formation 
of shared meanings in a loosely defined cultural and professional context that 
would also be amenable to change induced by external forces.  
VIII.  SEEING (IN) HISTORY 
The turn to contextual readings of international law marks a welcome advance 
from the older search of origins and the progressive accounting of international 
doctrines that accompanied traditional histories. Reading Vitoria as a “human 
rights lawyer” can scarcely be taken as a serious historical engagement with him. 
Nevertheless, there was something valuable in the sweeping normativity of older 
histories, in the way they sought to produce “lessons” from their narratives. A 
careful reconstruction of the context cannot be all. Critical history must also 
examine how those contexts were formed and to what extent they have persisted to 
make the world into what it has become today. 
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There is much reason to continue reflecting about the sixteenth century 
Spanish theologians also in normative terms. As we compose our narratives about 
Vitoria and his colleagues, we shall continue to differ in ways that reflect our 
normative predispositions—and our readers will continue to be differently 
influenced. They may perhaps be moved by the plight of intellectuals pressed by 
the demands of power, faith, and the wish for integrity—or they might be outraged 
by their hypocrisy and lack of sensitivity to the consequences of their teaching. 
When they shift the scope of their vision from individuals and their institutions to 
the wider world, they will learn about how law participates as a supporter or critic 
of military operations, about state-building, about imperial ambitions, and about 
the virtues and vices of missions to civilize. In this process, our readers may also 
come to think of as strange and problematic that which earlier seemed unthinkingly 
familiar—the fact, for example, that massive poverty in the world can be upheld by 
theological respect to the right of property whose contours have nevertheless 
varied sharply across contexts. They may also come to find out that neither 
“inclusion” nor “exclusion” appears as a prima facie beneficial basis on which to 
move about in the world but that every relationship has its specific nature and 
history, and that even as patterns and paradigms do form, they never account for 
the full sphere of future possibilities. 
Which leads me to my final point. The reduction of a historical narrative to its 
context is relative to the way the historian frames the context, decides its scope, 
and chooses its scale. But, history is not just incommensurate contexts 
miraculously collapsing into each other. In order to account for change, historians 
must accept that however thick a description of a context they have achieved, it 
never exhausts all future possibility. It is also part of the critical legal acquis not 
just to focus into how contexts reproduce themselves and their accompanying 
structures of domination but to also examine context-breaking moments, ideas, and 
practices that transform what was earlier taken for granted, as well as the 
accompanying hierarchies.71 Historians are familiar with the distinction between 
great, context-changing “events” and the monotonous routines through which the 
context merely keeps reproducing itself. 72 Such events draw upon the way that the 
boundaries of a context—any context—are porous and enable interactions and 
processes that may lead to the transformation of the context itself—an “epoch” 
turns into another, a realist historian might later come to write. In their preface to a 
recent work on “events,” in international law, the editors highlight the 
opportunities opened by moments or activities that rise against the gray normality 
of routine applications of the law and instead move the law forward, contribute to 
crystallizing a substance or a content that seems “‘startlingly inconsistent’ with 
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that which had come before.”73 Such events, rare as they are, cannot be reduced to 
the context, even as one must be wary of an international law in which “reform” 
has tended to operate precisely like this.74 Stereotypical context-breaking “events” 
in the political world are of course great revolutions—the French and the October 
Revolutions, but perhaps also “1989,” the Arab Spring and the whole process 
leading up to the demise of the West. But “events” do not have to be grand scale; 
they can also consist of minute acts where the expectation is not realized, where 
the counting is disturbed—acts of resistance or as de Certeau pointed out, 
“deviation,” a breakdown of the symbolic and thereby also the political order.75 
The discovery of the new world certainly was an “event” of this type, but so 
was getting rid of the prohibition of usury—colonialism and commercial expansion 
both being parts of the world in which Vitoria operated and to which he gave 
intellectual articulation. Using old materials in innovative ways he, like Grotius, 
opened possibilities of thinking and acting for his contemporaries that were not 
visible earlier, or at least not in the same way. Attention to such context-breaking 
events, or minuscule moments where the new is being articulated for the first time, 
is surely as necessary as attention to the ways in which contexts and their 
articulations keep reproducing themselves—the way, for example, Vitoria and 
Grotius both regarded their religious writings as the core of their oeuvre. Stability 
needs explaining, but so needs change. It is hard to think of a task that would be 
more important today than to encourage a live sense of the possibility that even as 
everything seems to be bogged down in routine, we might already be living an 
event that finally breaks it up. 
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